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Vermont Yankee in California's Courts

JOEL S. MOSKOWITZ*

If a state agency governed by California's Administrative Procedure
Act' adopts regulations in compliance with the explicit requirements of
the Act, are the regulations immune from attack on procedural
grounds, or are the courts at liberty to declare the regulations void on
the ground that employment of additional procedures was required to
ensure the "fairness" of the proceedings? This fundamental question
has never been definitively answered in California.
The United States Supreme Court answered this question most
forcefully for agencies operating under the federal Administrative Procedure Act 2 when it held, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
NRDC:3
"[N]othing in the APA, NEPA, the circumstances of this case, the
nature of the issues being considered, past agency practice, or the
statutory mandate under which the Commission operates permitted
the court to review and overturn the rulemaking proceeding on the
basis of the procedural devices employed (or not employed) by the
Commission so long as the Commission employed (at least) the
statutory minima, a matter about which there is no doubt in this
case.

4

* Deputy Attorney General, State of California; B.A. 1967, J.D. 1970, University of California at Los Angeles. The author is employed in the Environment Section of the Attorney Generars Office, where he represents various state regulatory agencies. The views expressed in this
article are those of the author and not necessarily those of his office.
I. CAL. Gov'T CODE §11342.
2. 5 U.S.C. §553 (1976).
3. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
4. Id. at 548.
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Under ordinary circumstances, this ruling would harbinger the response of the California courts when confronted with the same question. After all, California's Administrative Procedure Act was
patterned on the federal Act,5 and in such a circumstance the attribute
of "great weight" which attaches to federal decisions,6 and particularly
those of the United States Supreme Court,7 finds special application."
The decision in Vermont Yankee, however, has inspired scholarly
criticism of particular vehemence.9 The California Supreme Court,
while not subscribing to these views, has taken note of Professor Davis'
"scathing criticism of Vermont Yankee."'" One California trial court,
thus inspired, has rejected the application of Vermont Yankee in California," and has ruled that California courts are free to order the repeal of administrative regulations if, in retrospective analysis,
according additional procedural protections was required to render the
particular proceedings "entirely fair and reasonable. ' "'2 The outcome
of the appeal 3 in this case may decide whether California will join at
least four other states' 4 which have accepted the decision in Vermont
5. California Optometric Ass'n v. Lackner, 60 Cal. App. 3d 500, 507, 131 Cal. Rptr. 744, 749
(1976); Schenley Affiliated Brands Corp. v. Kirby, 21 Cal. App. 3d 177, 192, 98 Cal. Rptr. 609, 621
(1971).
6. People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 3d 80, 86, 460 P.2d 129, 132, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457, 460 (1969); San
Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Superior Ct., 67 Cal. App. 3d 361, 371, 136 Cal. Rptr. 557, 563 (1977);
Debtor Reorganizations, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 58 Cal. App. 3d 691, 696, 130 Cal. Rptr.
64, 67 (1976); People v. Cummings, 43 Cal. App. 3d 1008, 1019, 118 Cal. Rptr. 289, 296 (1974);
Silman v. Reghetti, 7 Cal. App. 2d 726, 729, 47 P.2d 291, 293 (1935).
7. See Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 12 Cal. 2d 85, 89, 82 P.2d 391, 393 (1938), apeal dimissed, 306 U.S. 621 (1938); Crocker v. Scott, 149 Cal. 575, 582-83, 87 P. 102, 105 (1906).
8. See, e.g., Social Workers' Union, Local 535 v. Alameda County Welfare Dep't, I1 Cal.
3d 382, 391, 521 P.2d 453, 459, 113 Cal. Rptr. 461, 467 (1974); Friends of Mammoth v. Board of
Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 260-61, 502 P.2d 1049, 1057-058, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 769-70 (1972);
Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees, Local No. 88, 53 Cal. 2d 455, 459-60, 349 P.2d 76,
79, 2 Cal. Rptr. 470,473 (1960); Suburban Mobile Homes, Inc. v. AMFAC Communities, Inc., 101
Cal. App. 3d 532, 540, 161 Cal. Rptr. 811, 815 (1980); Pacific Water Conditioning Ass'n Inc. v.
City Council, 73 Cal. App. 3d 546, 556, 140 Cal. Rptr. 812, 818 (1977); Shawn v. Golden Gate
Bridge Highway & Trans. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 699, 702, 131 Cal. Rptr. 867, 869 (1976).
9. E.g., K. DAVIS, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 605-16 (1978), 67 (Supp. 1980); Na-

thanson, The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Opinion: A Masterpiece of Statutory Misinterpretation, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 183 (1979); Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of
Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805 (1978). The decision has not, however, been
without its defenders. E.g., Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Court's Role in the Nuclear Energy
Controversy, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1833 (1978); Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution ofAdministrative Procedure: A Somewhat Different View, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1823 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Byse].
10. California Hotel & Motel Ass'n v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 25 Cal. 3d 200, 214 n.36,
599 P.2d 31, 40, n.36, 157 Cal. Rptr. 840, 849 n.36 (1979). Whatever predictive importance is
ascribed to this mention must be tempered by the fact that only three of the seven judges who
decided that case were sitting members of the Court, id. at 204, 599 P.2d at 33, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
842, and one of these three, Justice Newman, dissented. Id. at 216, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 850, 599 P.2d
at 41.
11. Western Oil and Gas Ass'n v. California State Air Resources Bd., No. C246284, (Los
Angeles Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 1980).
12. Id. at 6.
13. Id. An appeal was taken on January 8, 1981.
14. Somer v. Woodhouse, 28 Wash. App. 275, 623 P.2d 1164, 1171 (1981); Grocery Mfrs. of
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Yankee as their own.
The thesis of this article is that California should adopt the rule in
Vermont Yankee. The criticisms which have been directed to the
Supreme Court's analysis of the federal Act are entirely inapplicable to
the California Act. The criticisms founded on policy considerations devolve, for the most part, to support of continuing the trend toward judicial activism in administrative law as good in se, and have failed to
address, let alone balance, the policy considerations which moved the
Supreme Court, not the least of which is the need for an agency to
know, in advance, what procedures must be followed to produce a regulation immune from procedural attack.
DUE PROCESS AND THE APA
Decisions preceding Vermont Yankee often articulated tests evocative of "procedural due process" for deciding when procedural requirements not specified in the federal Act will be imposed. For example,
the District of Columbia Circuit, a fountainhead of much administrative law, put the test as follows: "This Court has long recognized that
basic considerations of fairness may dictate procedural requirements
not specified by Congress."' 5 The federal courts thus sought to identify, under the particular circumstances presented, "procedural requirements... inherent in the very concept of fair hearing,"' 6 and those
requisite to a meaningful opportunity to be heard.' 7 Eschewing definite rules,' 8 the courts would examine the proceedingspost hoc and
overturn a regulation if the agency did not utilize procedures which
were dictated by fairness but not required by a strict reading of the
APA.' 9 These foundations unmistakably echo the due process requirements of "fundamental fairness" 20 and "an opportunity to be heard
in a meaningful manner.'
...
Our analysis might, then, usefully start with the observation that
California courts have thus far clung unanimously to the proposition
Am. v. Department of Public Health, 393 N.E.2d 881, 889 (Mass. 1979); Northern Plains v. Board
Natural Resources, 594 P.2d 297, 303 (Mont. 1979); Tri-State Generation v. Environmental Quality, 590 P.2d 1324, 1331-332 (Wyo. 1979).
15. O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Walter Holm & Company v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
16. American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 359 P.2d 624, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
17. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1977); International Harvester Company v. Ruckleshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
18. See text accompanying notes 94-102 infra.
19. Bunker Hill Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 572 F.2d 1289, 1305 (9th Cir.
1977).
20. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1931).
21. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, rehearingdenied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).

Pacfc Law Journal/ Vol 13

that the requirements of "procedural due process" play no role in determining how an agency acting in a quasi-legislative capacity22 must
proceed. A typical statement of the rule recently appeared in Building
Code Action v. Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Comm'n 2 3 where the California Court of Appeals noted that adoption
of regulations by the Energy Resources Commission was a quasi-legislative proceeding, to which notions of fairness or due process associated
with judicial or even quasi-adjudicatory proceedings are not applicable.24 The United States Supreme Court adheres to this idea as well.25
The reasons given for this rule are various, and vary as well in persuasive force. The most common, and least attractive, is that because
one has no right to a hearing in quasi-legislative proceedings, one has
no complaint
if the hearing, having been accorded, is conducted
26
unfairly.

A variation on this theme, with the focus shifted from the process to
the product, asserts that it is only in a quasi-judicial proceeding that
"the rights of persons are involved. . .[whereas] [n]o one has aright to
the adoption of legislation."' 27
A third reason, advanced by Justice Holmes, in Bi-Metallic Co. v.
Colorado, is that according a chance to be heard in quasi-legislative
proceedings would be impractical in many instances:
When a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is impracticable that every one should have a direct voice in its adoption.
22. The distinction between "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" administrative actions is
sometimes difficult to draw. See Moskowitz, Spinning Gold into Straw.- The Ordinary Use of the
Extraordinary Writ ofMandamus to Review Quasi-LegislativeActions of CaliforniaAdministrative
Agencies, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 351 n.2 (1980). For present purposes, "quasi-legislative"
action is synonymous with the adoption of a "rule" or "regulation" by an administrative agency.
See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 35 n.2, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 805, 809 n.2, 520 P.2d 29, 33 n.2 (1974); 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §5.01
(1958).
23. 102 Cal. App. 3d 577, 162 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1980).
24. Id. at 584, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 738. See also Horn v. County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605,
612-13, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718, 721-22, 596 P.2d 1134, 1137 (1979); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Ct.,
36 Cal. 2d 538, 549, 225 P.2d 905, 911 (1950); Darley v. Ward, 103 Cal. App. 3d 207, 216, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 16, 21-22 (1980); City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n., 76 Cal. App. 3d
381, 388-89, 142 Cal. Rptr. 873, 877 (1978); California Optometric Assn. v. Lackner, 60 Cal. App.
3d 500, 505, 131 Cal. Rptr. 744, 748 (1976); California Grape League v. Industrial Welfare
Comm'n, 268 Cal. App. 2d 692,708-09,74 Cal. Rptr. 313, 323 (1969); Rivera v. Division of Industrial Welfare, 265 Cal. App. 2d 576, 587, 71 Cal. Rptr. 739, 750 (1968).
25. Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 372, 375, 441, 445 (1915). See also United States v.
Florida East Coast R. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 244-46 (1973).
26. There is no constitutional requirement for any hearing in a quasi-legislative proceeding;
hence the procedural requirements for conduct of the agency's hearings stem from the particular
statute rather than the constitutional demands of due process. 265 Cal. App. 2d at 587, 71 Cal.
Rptr. at 750. See also 103 Cal. App. 3d at 216, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 21-22; Cal. App. 3d at 388-89, 142
Cal. Rptr. at 877; 60 Cal. App. 3d at 505, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
27. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 389, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 877. But see Nathanson, The Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Opinion: A Masterpieceof StatutoryMisinterpretation, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 183,
204-05 (1979).
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The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town

meeting or an assembly of the whole. General statutes within the
state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to
be heard. Their rights are protected in the only way they can be in a
complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those
who make the rule.2 s
The California Supreme Court has subscribed to the reasoning of
Holmes.2 9

Perhaps the most satisfying rationale, however, was posited by Justice Frankfurter in Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath:30
[W]hen decisions of administrative officers in execution of legislation
turn exclusively on considerations similar to those on which the legislative body could itself have acted summarily, notice and hearing
may not be commanded by the Constitution. 3 '

To turn the argument around, administrative agencies acting in a
quasi-legislative capacity are merely performing tasks which would
otherwise be performed by the Legislature directly.32 If "due process"
hearing requirements could be imposed by the courts upon the agen-

cies, little reason would exist why they could not be imposed upon the
Legislature as well. While this "slippery slope" argument would not
move someone untroubled by that result, it would represent a major
and novel abrogation of power by the courts, and would quite possibly
offend the principle of separation of powers.33
The only judicial expression of discontent with the rule that quasilegislative proceedings are not subject to the demands of due process

was registered by Justice Newman of the California Supreme Court in
Horn v. County of Ventura34 where, in a concurring opinion, he called
28. Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. at 445 (1915).
29. Horn v. County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d at 613, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 721-22, 596 P.2d at 1137138; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 2d 549, 225 P.2d 911 (1950).
30. 341 U.S. 123 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 167.
32. As was said in Gaylord v. City of Pasadena, 175 Cal. 433, 166 P. 348 (1917):
Even a casual observer of governmental growth and development must have observed
the ever-increasing multiplicity and complexity of administrative affairs-national, state
and municipal-and even the occasional reader of the law must have perceived that

from necessity, if for no better grounded reason, it has become increasingly imperative
that many quasi-legislative. . . functions, which in smaller communities and under
more primitive conditions were performed directly by the legislative. . . [branch] of the
government, are intrusted to departments, boards, commissions and agents. . . . These
things must be done in this way or they cannot be done at all ....
Id. at 436, 166 P. at 350 (emphasis original).
33. French v. Senate, 146 Cal. 604, 608, 80 P. 1031, 1033 (1905) ("The senate has power to
adopt any procedure and to change it at any time and without notice. . . . Its action in any given
case is the only criterion by which to determine the rule of proceeding adopted for that case.");
Brock v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 2d 594, 603, 241 P.2d 283, 289 (1952); Cal. Const., art. III,

§3.
34. See note 24 supra.
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for repudiation of "the hackneyed quotation" of Justice Holmes in BiMetallic Co. v. Colorado,3 the case which established the rule, on the
ground that modem statutes typically embody procedural protections,
"and we should not encourage legislators and rulemakers who conceivably yearn for a more comfortable past-when often they did proceed
without notice, without hearing, in protective secrecy."' 36 Of course, the
modem statutes which Justice Newman praises were enacted during
the period when the rule he condemns was firmly established, and he
cites no evidence of backsliding.
In any event, the ouster of due process requirements from quasi-legislative proceedings is firmly established. Therefore, if as Professor Davis rightly observes, there are "due process limitations in the
background, always present but seldom brought to the foregound,""
one must search for these limitations within the confines of the language of the Administrative Procedure Act. It is to that language
which we next turn.
STATUTORY ANALYSIS

The most recent incarnation of Professor Davis' statutory analysis
focuses upon 5 U.S.C. §559, which he notes was "overlooked" by the
Supreme Court and by all previous commentators, including himself.38
That section provides in pertinent part: "Nothing in this Act shall be
held to diminish the constitutional rights of any person or to limit or
repeal additional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law." Professor Davis argues that there are "three kinds of
law-constitutional law, statutory law, and common law, and [section
559] provided that nothing in the APA shall be interpreted to cut back
rights that stem from any one of the three kinds of law." 39 Notwithstanding, "[t]he main thrust of the Vermont Yankee opinion says the
opposite: It says that the APA does limit or repeal common law rights
created by the lower courts with respect to rulemaking procedure." 4
The same argument is made with respect to 5 U.S.C. §706 of the
Federal Act, which Professor Davis quotes for the proposition "that
'The reviewing court shall.

. .

set aside agency action.

. .

found to be

.. .without observance of procedure required by law.' The final word
35. See note 25 supra.

36. 24 Cal. 3d at 621, 596 P.2d at 1143, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
37. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 449 (1978), quotedby Justice Newman in
Horn v. County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d at 621, 596 P.2d at 1143, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
38. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 68 (Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS
Supp. 1980].
39. DAvis Supp. 1980, supra note 38, at 67.
40. DAVIS Supp. 1980, supra note 38, at 68.
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is 'law,' not 'statute.' "41
Giving maximum credence to this argument, its application to California's Administrative Procedure Act compels exactly the opposite

conclusion. The California parallel to 5 U.S.C. §559 is Government
Code section 11346, which provides in pertinent part: "[N]othing in
this article repeals or diminishes additional requirements imposed by
any such statute. 4 2
Likewise, the California parallel to 5 U.S.C. §706 is Government

Code section 11350, which provides in pertinent part: "Such regulation
may be declared to be invalid for a substantial failure to comply with
The critical difference in lanthe provisions of this chapter . . . ."
guage between the state statute and the federal statute on which it was
patterned 44 leads to the inference that the Legislature intended the stat-

utory requirements to govern, to the exclusion of constitutional analogy
or decisional superimposition. 45 The very weight of Professor Davis'

argument thus causes it to fall with the removal by the California Legislature of its key linguistic support.
One final statutory argument remains to be addressed. California
Government Code Section 11346 provides in part: "It is the purpose of
this article to establish basic minimum procedural requirements for the

adoption, amendment or repeal of administrative regulations.

46

With respect to the federal Act, Professor Davis argues: "The rele-

vant legislative history supports the idea that Congress intended to impose minimum procedural requirements, not maximum. ' 47 From this
premise, Professor Davis draws the following conclusions:
A statement that the APA imposed minimum proceduralprotections
would leave open the possibility that either the agency or a reviewing
41. DAVIS Supp. 1980, supra note 38, at 68.

42. CAL. GOV'T CODE §11346 (emphasis added).
43. Id. §11350 (emphasis added).

44. See note 5 supra.
45. Fairbanks v. Dawson, 9 Cal. 90, 93 (1858). See Richfield Oil Corp. v. Crawford, 39 Cal.
2d 729, 735, 249 P.2d 600, 604 (1952); Anthony v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 346, 355, 167
Cal. Rptr. 246 (1980); Hennigan v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 1,8, 125 Cal. Rptr. 408,
412 (1975); Foraker v. O'Brien, 50 Cal. App. 3d 856, 863, 124 Cal. Rptr. 110, 114 (1975).
46. CAL. GOV'T CODE §11346 (emphasis supplied).
47. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 69 (emphasis in original). "The Senate Committee said: 'The bill
...is not a specification of the details of administrative procedure, nor is it a codification of
administrative law. Instead,. . . there has been framed an outline of minimum basic essentials.'
(Emphasis added). S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1946). It is also said: 'By enacting
this bill, the Congress ...

will be laying down.

. .

a policy respecting the minimum requirements

of fair administrative procedure.' (Emphasis added.) Id. at 217. The House Committee said:
'The bill is an outline of minimum essential rights and procedures.' (Emphasis added.) Id. at 250.
The sponsor of the bill, Senator McCarran, said on the floor of the Senate that 'the bill
...is not a specification of the details of administrative procedure. Neither is it a codification of administrative law. It represents, instead, an outline of minimum basic essentials...'
Id. at 303-04. (Emphasis added.)"

Pacifc Law Journal/ Vo

13

court could add to the protections. But the Court spoke of maximum
requirements not of protections. Section 559 spoke of requirements.
And the Senate committee spoke of requirements. Congress and the

committee must have meant that courts could add to the requirments, for a statement that an agency imposes 'requirements' on itself is unnatural. Since the APA requirements were 'minimum
requirements,' somebody else-the courts-must have been left free
to add to the requirements, as the courts have done ever since the
APA was enacted in 1946.48
This argument is easily answered if attempt is made to apply it to the
California statute. The Legislature did indeed contemplate that additional requirements would be imposed on agencies by an outside
source; but that source was the Legislature itself, and not the courts, as
Professor Davis assumes in his "either.

.

.or" argument. Government

Code Section 11346 goes on to provide, in pertinent part: "[N]othing in
this article repeals or diminishes additionalrequirements imposed by
any such statute. '49 Had the Legislature intended that "nothing in this
article repeals or diminishes additional requirements" which the courts
might fancy to impose, it could have easily said so. The fact that section 559 of the federal Act, the analagous section, speaks of "additional
requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recognizedby law" weighs

strongly in favor of the Legislature meaning, in the California statute,
that any additional requirements would be imposed by other statutes
pertaining to specific state agencies.
A.

CaliforniaLabor Code Section 1177

One such "other statute," and the subject of recent construction by
the California Supreme Court, is Labor Code section 1177, which provides in pertinent part: "Each order of the commission shall include a
statement as to the basis upon which the order is predicated and shall
be concurred in by a majority of the commissioners. ' 50
In CaliforniaHotel& MotelAssn. v. IndustrialWelfare Comm.' elab-

orate guidance was given concerning what a "statement of basis"
should contain.52 In the course of this discussion, the Court effused on
the benefits of a "statement of basis."53 The Court followed with dicta
concerning the nature of judicial review:
A reviewing court will ask three questions: first, did the agency act
48. DAvIs, supra note 9, at 69.
49. CAL. GOV'T CODE §11346 (emphasis supplied).
50. CAL.LAB. CODE §1177.

51. 25 Cal. 3d 200, 599 P.2d 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1979).
52. Id. at 213-14, 599 P.2d at 39-40, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 848-49.
53. Id. at 210-11, 599 P.2d at 37-38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 846-47.
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within the scope of its delegated authority; second, did the agency
employ fair procedures; and third, was the agency action reasonable

* A court must ensure that an agency has adequately considered
all relevant factors, and has demonstrated a rational connection between these factors, the choice made, and the purposes of the enabling statute. 4

The argument is currently being made before a court of appeal that the
Supreme Court has here impliedly rejected Vermont Yankee and has

made that rejection explicit by routinely requiring a "statement of ba5
sis" as a predicate to any quasi-legislative action.Y
This reading seems clearly too broad. In the first place, the entire

discussion was headed "The Statement of Basis Issue (Labor Code Section 1177)."56 Secondly, the Court articulated its holding as being that

"the commission did not include an adequate statement of basis to support the order, as requiredby section 1177."5 7 While the Court praised

statements of basis generally,58 the Court narrowed the scope of its ruling by defining the standard for evaluating the statement of basis to be
that requiredby section 1177.59 Even the dissent, which argued force-

fully that the opinion was too broad, had no different understanding as
to whether a statutory requirement was being interpreted, rather than a

free-floating policy being judicially imposed.60
As the statute before the Court unequivocally required a "statement
as to the basis" of the decision, the case cannot be authority for the
proposition that such statements are required whether prescribed by
statute or not.6 1 The following year, when the Supreme Court was

again ruling with a majority of sitting members, the Court opined that
zoning regulations did not need to be accompanied by findings of
fact, 62 a result echoing decisions of courts of appeal.63 It would be in54. Id. at 212, 599 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
55. Bay Area League of Indus. Assoc., Inc., v. California State Air Resources Bd. (I Civil
52134).
56. 25 Cal. 3d at 209, 599 P.2d at 36, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
57. Id. at 204, 599 P.2d at 33, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 842 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 210-11, 599 P.2d at 37-38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 846-47.
59. Id. at 213, 559 P.2d at 39, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 848 (emphasis supplied).
60. Id. at 216, 599 P.2d at 41, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 850 (emphasis supplied).
I believe that experienced observers of how government agencies work will be astonished
to learn that, when a statuterequiresa statement 'as to the basis' on which rules are predicated, administrative rulemaking is now to be encumbered as follows:...
61. Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530 (1860); see People v. Bank of San Luis Obispo, 159 Cal. 65,
79, 112 P. 866, 872 (1910).
62. Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 522, 620 P.2d 565, 572, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 904, 911 (1980); No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 81 n.12, 529 P.2d 66, 74
n.12, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34, 42 n.12 (1974).
63. City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 76 Cal. App. 3d 381, 387-88,
142 Cal. Rptr. 873, 878 (1978); Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council, 68 Cal. App. 3d 467,
473, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977); Board of Supervisors v. California Highway Comm'n, 57 Cal. App.
3d 952, 961, 129 Cal. Rptr. 504, 509 (1976).
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correct, then, to read CaliforniaHotel as precedent extending beyond
Labor Code section 1117, and perilous speculation to regard it as a
"straw in the wind."
B. The Lackner Case
One additional case which bears on the proper interpretation of the
California Act, and which has also been read far too broadly, is Calfornia Optometric Assn. v. Lackner,' a case which predated Vermont
Yankee.
The holdings in that case would leave one unequivocally of the mind
that the court of appeal would agree with the decision in Vermont Yankee. The court first ruled that there is no requirement under the California Act that parties be allowed to appear in person and address the
agency orally; the agency need merely fix a time and place for the receipt of written statements and then close the public portion of the
hearing.65 Such a procedure would greatly limit the ability of the parties to engage in a dialogue, and rebut evidence received. The court
realized this and held that such rights are not guaranteed by the Act,
a fixed demand for trial-like
and that the trial court "errs by making
66
hearings" at the adoption proceedings.
Thus, the court ruled that the Act, "which permits the agency to proceed without opportunity for oral presentation is quite inconsistent
with unyielding rights of cross-examination and rebuttal. ' 67 Likewise,
the court reversed the trial court's judgment "confining the agency to
action based exclusively upon evidence admitted at a hearing. '6' The
court held that restricting
the agency to evidence produced at the time and place specified in
the public notice would generate undesirable inflexibility. Decisions
interpreting parallel statutes have discerned no subversion of statutory purpose, no fundamental unfairness when the agency considers
information received after the hearing.69
Finally, the court rejected the requirement imposed by the trial court
that the agency "prepare and adopt findings as a step additional to the
rule adoption."70
Obviously, some of the court's holdings could be vastly extended.
For example, what if virtually all of the data upon which the agency
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

60 Cal. App. 3d 500, 131 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1976).
Id. at 506-07, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 748-49.
Id. at 507, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
Id. at 508, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
Id., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
Id., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
Id., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
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relies was received after the hearing? Because the court was concerned
that the "opinion is vulnerable to serious misinterpretation" it undertook to render "some deliberate dicta."'" Unfortunately, the dicta
themselves are "vulnerable to serious mininterpretation:"
Like the Administrative Procedure Act itself, this decision deals only
with procedural minima. Fulfillment of these minimal directions
does not assure procedural invulnerability. The procedural directions of the APA are designed to promote fulfillment of its dual
objectives-meaningful public participation and effective judicial review. [Citation.] Although implied rather than expressed, these
objectives are just as statutory and just as binding as the APA's itemized directions. Compliance with procedural minima does not necessarily achieve these goals.7 2

The only examples given of the possible implementation of this ominous warning deal with inclusion of evidence in the record and opportunity for rebuttal of evidence.
On the first issue, the court is straightforward; evidence relied upon
must be placed
in a record because it is indispensible to informed judi73
cial review.
The discussion concerning rebuttal, however, is almost opaque. The
court first opines "that reception and consideration of post-hearing evidence need not result in unfairness" so long as the public hearings are
not "'paralleled by substantial "off record" investigations.' ,,74 To confuse the matter, the court immediately cites dicta from another case 75 to
the effect "that an agency 'may not base its decision upon evidence
outside the record and not made available for rebuttal by the affected
parties.' "76 The court then interpreted the Supreme Court decision in
Olive ProrationComm. v. Agriculture Comm.77 as requiring "a middle
ground between multilateral rebuttal among the contending parties and
their legitimate need to confront the body of data upon which the
agency intends to act."78

What, then, is required of an agency with respect to providing an
opportunity for rebuttal? The court says only: "A prescription so
71. Id. at 509, 131 Cal.Rptr. at 750.
72. Id.

73. Id. at 511, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
The body of evidence upon which the agency acted is indispensable to.. .informed
judicial review. A proceeding which satisfies the minimum standards of the APA may be

fatally deficient if it fails to satisfy the act's guarantee of effective judicial review.
74. Id. at 509-10, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 751.

75. Id. at 510, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 751, quoting California Ass'n of Nursing Homes, Inc. v.
Williams, 4 Cal. App. 3d 800, 84 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1970).
76. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 510, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 751; 4 Cal. App. 3d at 811, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
77. 17 Cal. 2d 204, 109 P.2d 918 (1941).
78. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 510, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
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vague leaves considerable to ad hoc agency practices."79 Unfortunately, a prescription so vague also leaves considerable to ad hoc judicial reversal. Taken as a whole, however, and considered in the context
of the cases cited, the meaning of the "deliberate dicta" is not impossible to reconstruct.
In the first place, the dicta cannot be read to swallow the holdings.
Any reading of the dicta to say that all material evidence must be made
available for rebuttal would be directly contrary to the statement that
"[n]o statutory or decisional doctrine establishes ineluctible rights of
.. . rebuttal at quasi-legislative hearings." 0 The best guidance to the
dicta concerning rebuttal is that the court announces that its orphic
pronouncements "were framed with an eye to the California Supreme
Court's Olive Proration decision .... "81
82
Olive Proration was concerned with a quasi-judicial decision
wherein the Court noted, in dicta, 83 that the decision was based, in
large measure, upon an unauthorized," survey conducted after the
hearing, and not subjected to cross-examination and rebuttal.85 The
Court observed that "[u]nder such circumstances, the statutory requirement of a hearing was not met."86
What the Court in Lackner alluded to, and what Olive Prorationillustrates, is that it is possible to extend the principle allowing the agencies to determine the procedures governing their hearings, even within
79. Id. at 511, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 752.

80. Id. at 507, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
81. Id. at 510, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
82. The sole issue to be determined at the hearing was whether a petition to terminate a

program for the marketing of olives was signed by persons representing the specific number of
producers and factors. "If, upon such hearing, it was established that the petition was sufficiently
signed, it was the duty of the commission to terminate the program." 17 Cal. 2d at 206, 109 P.2d
at 919.
The court noted that the order related to "individual rights." Id. at 209, 109 P.2d at 921. This
characterization, the nature of the issue to be determined, and the fact that the parties were said to
be "denied all right of cross-examination," id. at 210, a right not ordinarily applicable at quasilegislative hearings, Rivera v. Division of Indus. Welfare, 265 Cal. App. 2d 576, 71 Cal. Rptr. 739
(1968), negate the possibility that the Court considered the hearing to be quasi-legislative in
nature.
83. The decision of the Commission was overturned because the Commission attempted to
reverse its previous order, and "the determination of an administrative agency as to the existence

of a fact or status which is based upon a present or past group of facts may not thereafter be
altered or modified." 17 Cal. 2d at 209, 109 P.2d at 921. That holding made, the court
announced:
These conclusions make it unnecessary to consider the contention that the last two orders
of the commission are void because not made upon a hearing, as contemplated by the

statute.
Id. at 210, 109 P.2d at 921. The fact that the Court launched off into a discussion of that issue

anyway would not make that discussion any less "unnecessary" or any less dicta.
84. Id. at 211, 109 P.2d at 922.
85. Id. at 210, 109 P.2d at 921.
86. Id.
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the confines of the Administrative Procedure Act, to the point that no
"hearing" has been held at all, or that judicial review is impossible.
The possibility of judicial intervention was not, however, precluded
by Vermont Yankee when "extraordinary" 8 7 or "extremely compelling '5 88 circumstances were presented. The evil addressed in Vermont
Yankee was the routine undertaking by the courts "to explore the procedural format or to impose upon the agency its own notion of which
procedures are 'best' or most likely to further some vague, undefined
public good." 9
Taken as a whole, then, the decision in Lackner is fully reconcilable
with Vermont Yankee, however troubling its imprecise "deliberate
dicta" might appear out of context.
THE POLICIES UNDERLYING VERMONT YANKEE

Having concluded that the California Act does not allow for the in-

ference that courts are authorized to routinely superimpose procedural
requirements additional to those specified in the statutes, it remains to
be considered whether the granting of such power is, in all, a good idea.
To be sure, whether the Legislature ought to have granted such a power
says little about whether it did so. As was succinctly stated in California Code of Civil Procedure section 1858: "In the construction of a
statute . . . the office of the Judge is simply to ascertain and declare
what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what
9 Nonetheless, the United States Supreme
has been omitted .
Court in Vermont Yankee invoked what it felt to be "compelling rea91
sons" for construing the federal Act as it did, and Professor Davis
92
responded with policies he felt no less compelling. Should either side
so clearly prevail in demonstrating the benefits of its interpretation of
the Act that the opposite construction is revealed as "absurd," any lin93
gering doubts would naturally be resolved in favor of the winner. We
turn first, therefore, to the Supreme Court's "compelling reasons," and
thence to Professor Davis' response.
"...

87. 435 U.S. 519, 541 (1978).
88. Id. at 543; see Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 312-13 (1979).
89. 435 U.S. at 549.
90. "[lIt is beyond the power of this court to do more than construe the statutes as they have
been enacted"; Brown v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 120, 129, 410 P.2d 373, 379, 48 Cal. Rptr. 869, 875
(1966); "Courts do not sit as super-legislatures to determine the wisdom, desirability or propriety
of statutes enacted by the Legislature"; Estate of Horman, 5 Cal. 3d 62, 77, 485 P.2d 785, 796, 95
Cal. Rptr. 433, 444 (1971); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1858.
91. 435 U.S. at 546.
92. See text accompanying notes 106-109 infra.
93. Clements v. T.R. Bechtel Co., 43 Cal. 2d 227, 233, 273 P.2d 5, 9 (1954); Warner v. Kenny,
27 Cal. 2d 627, 629, 165 P.2d 889, 890 (1946); County of Orange v. Heim, 30 Cal. App. 3d 694,
713, 106 Cal. Rptr. 825, 841 (1973).
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The Supreme Court's Policies

The first policy which the Supreme Court invokes is the need for
procedural predictability; for an agency to have a fair idea in advance
of a hearing what procedures must be employed in order to produce a
regulation immune from reversal on procedural grounds.9 4
A good example of the uncertainties generated by ad hoc judicial
review based on vague formulae may be found in federal decisions
predating Vermont Yankee concerned with the right of cross-examination. In InternationalHarvester Company v. Ruckleshaus9 5 the District
of Columbia Circuit laid down the "rule":
. .. that a right of cross-examination, consistent with time limitations, might well extend to particular cases of need, on critical points
inadequate to probe 'soft' and
where the general procedure proved
96
witnesses.
and
subjects
sensitive
An agency unsure of how to apply this "rule" could look to the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Bunker Hill Co. v. EnvironmentalProtection
Agency, 97 where the right was said to depend on whether the "'proceeding involves specific issues of critical importance that cannot be
adequately ventilated' by normal procedures." 98 In requiring cross-examination in the instance before it, the court noted such factors as the
"highly complex and technical nature" of the subject matter9 9 and the
thoughts that cross-examination would "help crystalize the varying
contentions of the experts and help guarantee that both parties' experts
are responsive to criticisms and counterarguments" as well as "aid this
court in 1°reviewing the new regulations should an appeal be
brought.""
Obviously, each of these factors lies on a sliding scale, and no guidance is given, or could be given, concerning at which points on the
spectrum cross-examination is transformed from superfluous, to desira-

ble, to a "right."
94. 435 U.S. at 546-47.

In the first place, if courts continually review agency proceedings to determine whether
the agency employed procedures which were, in the court's opinion, perfectly tailored to
reach what the court perceives to be the 'best' or 'correct' result, the judicial review
would be totally unpredictable. And the agencies, operating under this vague injunction
to employ the 'best' procedures and facing the threat of reversal if they did not would

undoubtedly adopt full adjudicatory procedures in every instance. Not only would this
totally disrupt the statutory scheme, through which Congress enacted 'a formula upon
which opposing social and political forces have come to rest,' [citation], but all the inherent advantages of informal rulemaking would be totally lost.
95.
96.
97.
98.

478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Id. at 631.
572 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1305.

99. Id.
100. Id.
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The agency confronted with the practical problem of how it must
conduct its hearing might then return to the District of Columbia Circuit, to be told by the court in Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin:'10
What counts is the reality of an opportunity to submit an effective
take a
presentation, to assure that the Secretary and his assistants will
102
hard look at the problems in the light of those submissions.

Ironically, the court praised this "rule" on the ground that the agency
"is not shackled by rigidities of procedure that may stultify the regulatory program."'' 0 3 The agency is, rather, shackled by the need to guess
how the reviewing court will apply this meaningless test.
Clearing,posthoc and ad hoc application of these tests is an almost
irresistible invitation to litigation, for a party dissatisfied with the result
of a hearing would be hopelessly unimaginative if he could not pose
the metaphysical question of whether the provision of some additional
procedure might have rendered the proceedings more "fair and reasonable," or have assured a "harder look" at the evidence. Administrative
proceedings are thus transformed into a lawyers' game while substantive regulatory tasks delegated by the Legislature await the outcome of
a debate about whether "more" would have been "better." Any agency
serious about its task would clearly provide for cross-examination as a
routine matter, rather than be sucked into such a debate.
The Supreme Court's second "compelling reason," really a variation
of the first, is that the agency must decide before the hearing how to
structure the proceedings, while the courts will review that decision on
the basis of the evidence actually produced at the hearing."° As the
Court said: "This sort of Monday morning quarterbacking not only
encourages but almost compels the agency to conduct all rulemaking
proceedings with the full panoply of procedural devices normally associated only with adjudicatory hearings."'0

5

Finally, the Court denied that according additional procedures
would necessarily result in a more adequate record for purposes of review because the parties will have more of an opportunity to participate and contribute. The Court noted that informal rulemaking was
not required to be based solely on the transcript of the hearing, and
indeed the agency is not required to hold a formal hearing.0 6
101. 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
102. Id. at 1016.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
435 U.S. at 547.
Id.
Id.
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B. Davis' Answer

Turning to Professor Davis, it is especially noteworthy, given the intensity of his disapproval of Vermont Yankee, that he undertakes virtually no rejoinder at all to the Supreme Court's "compelling reasons."
Rather, Professor Davis offers an ode to judicial activism. In his
view, "the main thrust of the Vermont Yankee opinion is to stifle judicial creativity' 0 7 and this "effort to stifle judicial creativity is profoundly incompatible with the basic nature of the judicial process."' 08
The "basic nature of the judicial process" is, in his view, the role of the
courts in legislating.' 0 9 Professor Davis concludes "that a partnership
better law than either legislaof legislators and judges usually produces
0
tors or judges alone can produce.""11
While one can debate whether the body of judicial legislation of administrative law is "better law" than was enacted by Congress alone,
the chief problem, and danger, in Professor Davis' analysis is that he
seems to consider judicial activism as absolutely good in se, without
regard for the counterbalancing virtue of judicial restraint. Vermont
Yankee might best be read as a long-awaited corrective measure, in the
context of "judicial supervision of the functioning of administrative
agencies," of the "little-changing human tendencies to endeavor to
seize power."'I As Justice Powell once wrote on a concurring opinProfessor Davis described as "an especially thoughtion" 2 which even
113
ful opinion":
We should be ever mindful of the contradictions that would arise if a
democracy were to permit general oversight of the elected branches
of government by a non-representative, and in large measure insulated, judicial branch. .

.

. 'We must as judges recall that, Mr. Jus-

tice Holmes wisely observed, the other branches of the Government
are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in
107. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 67.
108. DAVis, supra note 9, at 74.
109. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 75-76.

What is best about American administrative law is the product of judicial legislation,
especially judicial legislation by the Supreme Court, and the main thrust of the Vermont
Yankee opinion is to cut offjudicial legislation with respect to rule making procedure
Does any discerning lawyer today doubt that the law draws its juices of life from
judges' views of policy, or that the tendency ofjudges today, as a century ago, is to keep
that process 'secret'? Do some of us-including some judges-fool ourselves through the
sustained pretense that judges find law and don't make it?
110. DAVIS SuPP. 1980, supra note 38, at 79 (Supp. 1980). As was related by Byse, supVra note
9, at 1828, n.21: Judge Friendly wryly observed of such pronouncements by the D.C. Circuit:
'There is little doubt who is considered to be the senior partner.' Friendly, 'Some Kind of Hearing,' 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1311 n.221 (1974).
I11.See Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571, 596 (2d Cir. 1975).
112. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
113. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 521 (1976).
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quite great a degree as the courts.' 114
Justice Powell, by way of contrast to Professor Davis, reflected "a wise

view of the need for judicial restraint if we are to preserve the Judiciary
as the branch 'least dangerous to the political rights of the
Constitution.

11115
. ..

The argument of Professor Davis, then, that the product of judicial
legislation is superior (itself somewhat questionable) takes insufficient
account of theprocess; of the necessarily limited role of judicial "legis-

lation" in a democracy. This is not to say that Professor Davis is wrong
in any absolute sense, only that his argument is one-sided and overdramatizes the intent of Vermont Yankee to cap the well of judicial creativ-

ity. As Professor Davis himself points out, cases following Vermont
Yankee have
managed to find statutory interstices for judicial
16
creativity.
CONCLUSION

On balance, it would seem that the Supreme Court's unanswered

practical objections to after-the-fact and case-by-case judicial review
are weightier than Professor Davis' jurisprudential objection that the
opinion stifles judicial creativity. After all, the function of quasi-legislative proceedings is not to provide perfect hearings, but to perform a
substantive task delegated by the Legislature. As the District of Co114. 418 U.S. at 188-89. In this regard, it is noteworthy that, in 1979, the legislature greatly
revised the Administrative Procedure Act to include a host of new procedural protections. STATS
1979, c. 567, §1, at 1778-95. For example, notices of hearing must now be given 45 days before the
hearing, rather than 30 days. CAL. GOV'T CODE §13346.4. Even before the notice is published, a
statement must now be prepared setting forth:
(a) The specific purpose of the regulation;
(b) The factual basis for the determination by the agency that the regulation is reasonably necessary to carry out the purpose for which it is proposed;
(c) The substantive facts or other information and the technical, theoretical and empirical studies, if any, on which the agency is relying in proposing the adoption or
amendment.
Id. §11346.7. Detailed requirements for maintaining an administrative record are also newly imposed. Id. §1 1347.3. The legislation also created an Office of Administrative Law with power to
block the effectiveness of an adopted regulation which does not demonstrate, inter alia, "necessity," "authority," "clarity" and "consistency." Id. at §11349.1.
This legislation belies the validity of Justice Newman's concern that failure to threaten judicial
imposition of "due process" requirements in regulatory proceedings will encourage backsliding to
proceedings "without notice, without hearing, in protective secrecy." Horn v. County of Ventura,
4 Cal. 3d 605, 621, 596 P.2d 1134, 1143, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718, 727 (1979). See also California
Optometric Ass'n v. Lackner, 60 Cal. App. 3d 500, 511, 131 Cal. Rptr. 744, 752 (1976).
115. 418 U.S. at 193. A similar point was made by Byse:
[W]hile I respect the ability, creativity, and resourcefulness of the members of the...
judiciary, I am unwilling to say that the end justifies what I believe is both an inappropriate judicial intrusion into the day-to-day deployment of agency resources and a disre-

gard of a congressionally mandated model of rulemaking in a situation where the court's
only legitimate interest, an adequate record, can be achieved by less intrusive means.
Byse, supra note 9, at 1832.
116. DAvis, upra note 9, at 81-82.
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itself a wellspring of activist decisions in administrative
lumbia Circuit, 17
1
law remarked:
The delay of agency rulemaking has become a scandal of such proportions as to merit the comments of judges, lawyers, legal commentators, and even Congress. As the Supreme Court demonstrated in
Vermont Yankee . . . rulemaking proceedings are overjudged and
overlawyered, with the result that the protection Congress has sought
to provide the public in authorizing agency rulemaking has, in many
instances, been a long time coming-if indeed it comes at all." 8

117. Association of Nat'1 Advertisers v. F.T.C., 617 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
118. Id. at 626 n.5.

